ABOUT THE AUTHOR- The author of this Research article, Ratikanta Das, is currently pursuing M.phil in Political science at Utkal University, and has also qualified for Junior Research Fellowship(JRF) and eligibility for Assistant Professor in the National Eligibility Test(UGC-NET).
INTRODUCTION-
South Asia has assumed much importance in international politics today. South Asia is an area lying south of Himalayas and the Hindukush mountains and surrounded by Indian Ocean on three sides. This region comprises eight independent countries and is a largest geographical reality of the Indian Ocean and occupies an important strategic, commercial and natural position. Although the region is located in a small area of world map, it consist nearly one fifth of worlds total population. This is a strange admixture of democracy, hereditary monarchy and dictatorship.There are a number of infrastructural linkages between the countries of this region like common history, a compact geographical area, almost similar economic systems, cultural and social commonalities. These states belong to non- aligned movement, have a shared view of the evils of colonialism, racialism and economic exploitation, all opposed to foreign bases and foreign intervention, all are embraced the concept of regional organization though with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
In spite of being one of the oldest part of world civilization, it was one of the first few areas to be victim of imperialism. Third worlds chronic problems are hitting the region as well. They are poor, under developed and backward, burdened with problems of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, over population, malnutrition, ignorance etc. Most of them are politically unstable, religion is a predominant factor in these countries .Problem of survival of democracy in large pluralist and relatively poor states is also very crucial; the levels of living of the massage are either lower or not substantially higher.
When we give a cursory glance of relations, we see that the countries of south Asia share a relationship of conflict and cooperation. Although in recent years they are realizing the strength of unity and are developing a closely-knit relationship. The process of mutual consultation, regional integration, democratic expansion and prosperity distribution is going on. SAARC marked the first regional effort to rise above residual prejudices and mistrust in order to evolve a positive framework of cooperative economic development to promote the welfare of the peoples of south Asia. No other region of the world has comparable commonality. The significance of Asian regional cooperation lies in the fact that it represents an effort to develop Asian solution to the Asian problems in a cooperative arrangement. Collective self- reliance of South Asian countries is both a means and an end. As a means it is the strategy to raise the regional collective economic status of these countries from one of dependence on the developed world, to that of being equal partners with it, thereby enabling the developing countries to demonstrate their power. This gives them the necessary negotiating strength in their dialogue with the North. As an end, collective self- reliance signifies a level of socioeconomic development of the countries of the region which taken together enables them in their collectivity to be self- dependent on themselves and all the individuals in these counties to have the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potentials.
Perception plays an immense important role in South Asian politics and it’s foreign policy-making of this region. They have largely shaped and influenced state policies and politics among the South Asian countries, especially in relations to India, over the years. The India’s perceptions towards South Asian countries also very sharp and influential in International system. State have policies at a time been hostage to negative or adversial perception, well entrenched into the popular psyche. The perception formation in South Asia is an extremely dynamic process and has evolved differently in different countries. The perception are not static and sometime change with the shift-domestic as well as regional and global politics. There are myriad stakeholders with various circumstances of their interests explicitly or implicitly shaping and influencing perceptions among countries in South Asia. India’s perception in south basically have staying been as the powerful nation due to it’s geographical, military and economic aspects. So India has always wanted to show itself as a powerful nation particularly in the South Asian region and wake up with both amicable and clash with them to portray itself as a global as well as it’s national interest.
POTENTIAL OF INDIA AS A BIG BROTHER
In geographical term, south Asia is essentially an Indo-centric region. India’s size, resources and power potential make its predominance in the South Asian power structure. India as a largest, strongest and the richest country of the region has a crucial role to shape the future and cooperation of these nations. India’s strategic location provides it a pivotal position in Asia and world politics. In fact India is a major connecting link between world trade and commercial inter – course with West Asia, South East Asia and East Asia. As Nehru stated that India is a kind of bridge between the East and the West.
India is the 7th largest nation in the world in terms of area, having world’s second largest population, world’s largest population with the knowledge of English language, consists largest work force of skilled labour and world’s largest democracy having world’s third largest army, India is well, recognized by world’s IT industry, India is producing cheap and affordable energy and now acquired nuclear power. The development of domestic market and consumer society, good rate of growth, limited inflation, huge foreign exchange reserves, expanding exports, satisfactory industrial development, economic consolidation and incoming foreign investment all are factors giving Indian economy a higher grade.
In nutshell India is having strength to give direction in every respect to fellow South Asian nations. Looking to this Indian potential superpowers are also very keen to engage India in their global strategies but India chose the independent path by following the policy of NAM and made its presence felt in North- South dialogue, South-South Cooperation, in demand for NIEO and efforts for disarmament.
ATTRIBUTES OF INDIA’S POWER IN SOUTH ASIA:-
The Structural approach to power concedes an advantaged position to India in South Asia. The India shares borders with all South Asian countries, making it the vital physical link in the region. 72 percent of the land surface in South Asia is occupied by India, 77 percent of the region’s population resides in India. India accounts for 75 percent of the regional economic output. The economic potential and military capabilities of India have made the country a primary regional force in South Asia. L. Kadirgamar has used the analogy of a wheel to depict centrality of India in South Asian affairs. According to him at the hub of the wheel lies regionally preponderant India. Radiating as spokes are India’s neighbours with each of whom India shares land or maritime boundaries, but no two others are thus joined without at the same time touching India also. Binding those spokes to that hub are the physical barriers.
The structural attributes of India’s power have been impressive enough to endow the country with added responsibilities. The South Asian nations in particular and global powers in general regard India to assume additional responsibility for ensuing regional development and cohesion. Statements of Heads of State at the inaugural Summit of SAARC reflect the degree of ‘power’ entrusted on the largest South Asian state – India powers in general regard India to assume additional responsibility for ensuing regional development and cohesion. Statements of Heads of State at the inaugural Summit of SAARC reflect the degree of ‘power’ entrusted on the largest South Asian state – India. India was expected to “by deeds and words create the confidence among us so necessary to make a beginning. India was referred to as the “key to the development and progress of SAARC.” India’s responsibility in shaping and directing the cooperation drive was recognised by extra-regional powers. “The size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and World affairs. They confer on it at the same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails.” The overall changes in internal politics after the cold war further reinforced the primacy of India factor in the region. Many countries consider India as “a factor for the stability and protection of democracies and human rights in the South Asian region.
INDIA AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON: POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS
A mere variation in the degree and kind of power variables does not lead to hegemony. Hegemony is the privileged exercise of power in complete disregard to the interests of other states. India’s policies and regional perceptions are examined in this section to ascertain the validity of characterising India as a hegemon. Indian policies with regard to the liberation movement in Bangladesh in 1971, the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the attempted military coup in Maldives in 1988 are cited as illustrations of India’s hegemonic authority in region. Even diplomatic statements, like the Indian Government’s comment on the deteriorating conditions in Balochistan and also the advice for Pakistan Government to exercise restraint has been interpreted as interference by India. India has defended its Bangladesh policy on the grounds that India intervened only after her requests to the U.N. to act against Pakistan failed to yield results. The Guardian had described the Pakistani troops’ atrocities as an arrogant crime against humanity and human aspirations. Given the compulsions of national security coupled with the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan, India sought to provide military assistance that led to the emergence of Bangladesh. The military involvement by India is further defended by referring to the request for the same by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh. Despite all justifications, the role played by India in the emergence of Bangladesh is viewed even today as a vindication of the regional apprehensions. The most important result of the 1971 crisis on regional perceptions has been the demonstrated ability of India to alter the geo-political landscape of South Asia. Though 1971 can be claimed by India to be an exceptional case, it exists as a tangible evidence of India’s over-bearing presence in the region. India is accused of using the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 to assert its military potential in the region. The accord allowed India’s diplomatic involvement in resolving the confrontation between the Tamil and Singhalese in Sri Lanka and the option of military assistance was expected to be contingency clause, which few expected would be utilized. The deterioration of the security situation in Sri Lanka and the fickle policies of President Premadasa forced India to get militarily involved in the Island politics. The professions of caution and restraint provided by India have done little to address the regional fear psychosis generated in response to the episode. The fallout of India’s gaffe in Sri Lanka was so immense that even the ministerial level meetings for launching SAARC were adversely affected.
In November 1988 the Indian military in response to a request by the de jure government of Maldives helped to crush an attempted coup on the island. The Maldives episode, as an individual case study would have perhaps not invited much attention, but the fact that it took place barely a year after India’s military involvement in Sri Lanka sought to reinforce the negative perceptions about India. The importance of the Maldivian episode lies in the kind of the reinforcements it provided for the apprehensions about India’s politico-military clout in South Asia.
India’s relations with her South Asian neighbours is characterised by numerous bilateral contentions. India favours a bilateral dialogue for addressing these concerns, while the neighbours demand a multilateral regional approach. India fears that the neighbours would gang-up against her and demand unrealistic concessions in a multi-lateral milieu, while the neighbours suspect that India seeks to take undue advantage of the weak bargaining capacity of each state in a bilateral dialogue. Neighbours view Indian bilateralism as an instrument of coercive diplomacy, while India considers the demand of multilateralism as an unnecessary burden of the nascent and fragile process of SAARC. Inter-state interaction is a multi-dimensional process involving bilateral, regional and other forms of multilateral relations. In South Asia the disagreement over the most preferred strategy emerges from and further reinforces the perceptual divergence among regional states. The psychological predispositions have come to be so shaped that any reference of bilateralism translates into possibilities of Indian hegemony and any assertion of multilateralism is deciphered as a pressure generating tactic, irrespective of the actual merits of either approaches. The most obvious example cited as a justification of India’s hegemonic aspirations is the Indira Doctrine. The origins of the Doctrine are traced to the Sri Lankan crisis of 1988 and laid down that India would consider the presence or influence of an external power in the region as adverse to its interests. India’s justification for the policy was an attempt to insulate the region from the adverse effects of the Cold War, but the neighbours viewed it as a policy to abolish any challenge to India’s regional position. In the recent years India has not only allowed but in fact aligned with extra-regional powers to address regional issues, but the regional perceptions fail to take cognizance of these developments. The 1997 Pakistan National Elections were observed by the Commonwealth Secretary General, the EU Election Observation Mission participated in the 2002 General Elections in Pakistan. The 2001 General Elections in Bangladesh was attended by the UN Electoral Assistance Secretariat and the EU Election Observation Mission. There was ‘outstanding cooperation’ between US and Indian ambassadors to try and get Nepal back to multiparty democracy. The Gujral Doctrine, India’s policy of providing unilateral concession to South Asian neighbours without seeking reciprocity, proved to be too mild in the face of the impregnable perceptual framework of India’s neighbours. Altaf Gauhar, leading Pakistani columnist commented that, “The Gujral Doctrine is not a doctrine of good neighbourly relations but a Bharti Plan to seize the neighbour peacefully”. Regional economic cooperation is viewed by regional states as a mechanism of ensuring the economic empowerment of India at the expense of her South Asian neighbours. The South Asian countries were not enthusiastic about South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) because they felt that the impact of their unfavourable trade balance with India would be accentuated if liberalization is encouraged in regional context. Countries in the region also fear that if market forces are allowed to guide the intraregional trade India would emerge as the dominating factor leading to the political dependence of these states on India. Saddar Assef Ali, Foreign Minister of Pakistan and Mr. Mustafizur Rahman, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh clearly stated that despite their obligations under the Marrakesh and WTO arrangement they would not be able to respond to India under those obligations till political issues like Kashmir and Farakka are resolved. Pakistan refuses to grant India MFN status. Political perceptions have come to cloud economic rationality in the region. The Bangladeshi Government has rejected the proposal of an American Company to supply gas from Sylhet to New Delhi through pipelines. Despite being aware of the obvious economic advantages of the proposal, Bangladesh has rejected this World Bank recommended project on grounds that it is not in the interest of Bangladesh. The fear rather than the existence of Indian hegemon makes the South Asian states apathetic to pursuing mutually beneficial economic policies.
INDIA AS REGIONAL LEADER: POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS
It is axiomatic that India’s size and level of development enjoins on it the responsibility of being the natural fulcrum in the process of South Asian development. In dealing with regional concerns India claims to perform its leadership role by pursuing policies to further the common interest of regional states. But the hesitant and cautious policies pursued by India contradict the qualities of dynamic leadership. On the pretext of countering regional apprehensions, India has on many occasions abandoned the leadership mantle. Ironically such policies have fueled allegations of lack of interest on India’s part for regional concerns. Hence India’s policies of avoiding leadership have led to perceptions of abandonment of regional responsibilities. Dynamism is the most basic quality of leadership, which has not been demonstrated by India India has shown reluctance for updating the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 and the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of 1972 despite repeated demands by the two states. The Indo Bhutan Treaty of 1949 was updated only recently in 2007. Diplomatic dynamism implies making the right move when time is opportune; a characteristic missing in India’s regional manoeuvres. The insistence by India for signing a five year agreement with Bangladesh allowing it to transport goods to the North-East of India at the side-lines of the SAARC Summit in Sri Lanka in early August 2008 reflects the political naiveté of India. Without getting an assurance from Bangladesh on the issue, a public statement by the India’s Ministry of External Affairs on the possibility of signing an agreement only contributed in straining bilateral relations. Moreover expecting the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh to decide on such a sensitive issue demonstrates how distanced is India’s approach from the regional realities.
In dealing with national political crisis, the South Asian states expect India to play a determining role. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, Vice President, Maldivian Democratic Party, expected India to play a more active role in ensuring that true democracy is ushered in Maldives, rather than strengthening the hands of the dictatorial regime through defence packages.
THE CHALLENGE OF A RESENTFUL, DANGEROUS NEIGHBOURHOOD
Ideally, India would prefer a peaceful, prosperous neighbourhood responsive to its own needs and wishes. But such ideal conditions have never prevailed and are unlikely to in the foreseeable future.
Unlike the United States, or indeed, the Russian Federation, India is not a fully convincing hegemon within its own sub-region insofar as it has regularly been challenged militarily by Pakistan (and also in other violent ways by actors based in Pakistan). Bangladesh harbours ambiguous sentiments towards its neighbour (on all sides except the Bay of Bengal to its south and Myanmar to the east), sharing with it much pre-1947 history, and owing to India its own birth in 1971, overtaking its identity as the East Bengal province of Pakistan after 1947. Its Muslim identity, poverty (encouraging migration to India) and troubled relations with India’s north-eastern states which Pakistan had coveted in 1947, amongst other factors, have made for a complex, often uncomfortable relationship.
As detailed further on, such has also been the nature of India’s relations with some other immediate neighbours, coloured by much local anti-Indian sentiment that India has rarely tried to dispel or succeeded in reducing. Some sympathy is in order with India’s “Gringo problem”. Observers of the Americas might note that no matter what administration is in power in Washington and irrespective of its hemispheric policies, widespread, reflexive and sometimes virulent anti-Americanism is a constant. While dwarfed by India’s size, population and sub-regional weight, several of these neighbours are consequential states in their own right and reluctant to bow to Indian predominance or pressure. Thus, the challenge of managing asymmetry in its neighbourhood relationships, within its notional “sphere of influence”, is not only a real, but also a serious one. India has not always met this challenge impressively in the past, occasionally displaying brusque manners and rough tactics, with indifferent and sometimes counterproductive results. While India’s economic liberalisation and consequent sharply higher economic growth allowed the country to cast itself as a potential regional economic locomotive, none of its neighbours, except for Bhutan, and, possibly the Maldives, in practice accepted this logic (not least given India’s feeble efforts at promoting regional economic cooperation within the framework of SAARC). This strand of Indian policy is, in fact, both rational and helpful, but New Delhi clearly has not done enough to make greater economic integration politically attractive and administratively feasible. One feature of India’s political life is replicated in several of the neighbouring countries: dynastic rule by one or several political families, in which power passes as readily to matriarchs as to patriarchs. Periods of often disastrous and corrupt dynastic rule are frequently interrupted by military coups introducing military-led government of equally disastrous consequence, but in different ways. When the bankruptcy of the latter becomes clear, some form of electoral consultation leads to a resumption of dynastic rule. Bangladesh has provided a running parody of the model for many years.
INDIA’S OBJECTIVES TOWARDS IT’S NEIGHBOURS
India accepts the reality that it must live with the neighbours it has, preferably peacefully. Translated into the serene cadences of diplomatic communication, the Indian Foreign Ministry couched matters as follows: “With the objective of a peaceful, stable and prosperous neighbourhood, India continues to attach the highest priority to close and good neighbourly political, economic and cultural relations with its neighbours”, and also noted that this should be carried out “on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect”. Hence, one of the cornerstones of India’s stated foreign policy, not a notably successful one to date, has been to build a strategically secure, politically stable, harmonious, and economically cooperative neighbourhood. The ideas are right, as is the notion of India leading the integration of South Asian markets, thus creating a web of regional interdependence, although hardly original.18 Worries in India about maintaining and enhancing its sub-regional strategic superiority seem, to an outsider, overblown. India’s indigenous capacity to maintain and enhance it is increasing rather than the reverse.
INDIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH IT’S SOUTH ASIAN NEIGHBOURS
PAKISTAN- India’s relationship with Pakistan is the most intractable and difficult in its immediate region and one with which it grapples internationally. At the core of animosities lies the question of Kashmir. In recent years, Pakistan, rarely a beacon of stability, has been experiencing enhanced political volatility and internal violence. This violence has spilled over into India several times, with or without the collusion of the government in Islamabad, and has sorely tested the patience and restraint of the Indian nation and its government. Nevertheless, largescale hostilities have been avoided since 1971 and the nuclear weapons capacity of both countries may, in fact, have rendered all-out war much more unlikely than in the past decades. Pakistan was born as a separate Muslim state in August 1947. Though for centuries, Hindus and Muslims had lived together in the subcontinent, the partition created unprecedented hostilities between secular India and Islamic Pakistan. Stephen P. Cohen cited an observation by G. Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan that trying to effect India-Pakistan reconciliation is like trying to treat two patients whose only disease is an allergy to each other. For the past 60 years, India-Pakistan relations have been fraught. It is one of “the most enduring rivalries of the post-World War II era.” Successive Indian and Pakistani governments have attempted to negotiate and resolve outstanding problems, sometimes achieving limited if real success (for example, with World Bank participation and assistance, on the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960), but the overall relationship has never improved fundamentally for long.
TABLE: Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan
❖ 1-An agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities 31 December 1988,
❖ 2- A couple of military Confidence-Building Measures 1991
❖ 3- Agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons 19 August 1992,
❖ 4- An agreement to negotiate more measures to bring more military stability 1999,
❖ 5- Bus service between New Delhi and Lahore 1999,
❖ 6-India’s announcement of easing of visa rules for visiting Pakistani journalists, doctors and academics 9 September 2004,
❖ 7-Expert level talks on Nuclear CBMs December 2004
❖ 8-Bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad 7 April 2005
❖ 9-Agreement reached on the establishment of a hot line between the two maritime security agencies 4 October 2005,
❖ 10-Bus service from Lahore to Amritsar 20 January 2006,
❖ 11-Fibre optic link between Amritsar and Lahore 27 February 2006,
❖ 12-Agreement to jointly fight human trafficking, counterfeit currency trade, and illegal immigration 22 March 2006,
❖ 13-Amritsar-Nankana Sahib Bus service 24 March 2006.
There have also been extensive discussions, both formal and informal, between the two governments over the sensitive Kashmir issue, with each (up to a point) supporting “track two” discussions among leading scholars, retired officials and writers. Indeed, at times, it has seemed as if “track two” activity was the main growth industry involving both countries.
And yet, beyond such Pakistani military adventurism as the ill-advised Kargil operation of 1999, spectacular incidents of terrorism, with proven or suspected links to Pakistan, have all too frequently disrupted the efforts to improve ties between the two countries and have repeatedly placed Indian governments at risk of looking “weak” in the absence of reprisals. For example, on 24 December 1999, five armed Islamic terrorists, later found to have Pakistani connections, hijacked an Indian Airlines flight after its departure from Kathmandu and, after touching down in Amritsar, Lahore, and Dubai, forced it to land in Kandahar. At the end of six days, during which the hijackers killed one of the 178 passengers and injured several others, the ordeal ended when New Delhi agreed to release three Islamic militants36 jailed in India who were associated with Pakistan-backed Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisations, such as the Harkat-ul-Ansar.37 Then-Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh flew with the terrorists to Kandahar in order to secure the release of the hostages.38 The decision to allow Jaswant Singh to do so was a very difficult one for the Indian government, which had always rejected negotiations with terrorists. Among other incidents challenging the bilateral relationship, the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament resulting in the deaths of nine policemen and Parliament staffers (and also the five terrorists, who were identified as Pakistani nationals) stands out. On 26 November 2008, terrorists later established to have been Pakistani citizens attacked Mumbai, resulting in nearly 200 dead. Kashmir remains at the crux of the tortured relationship between India and Pakistan. At different times, both countries have betrayed the aspirations of Kashmiris for independence or, at least, meaningful autonomy, but, over the years, in spite of a harsh Indian military occupation of the Kashmir valley, Pakistan has increasingly come to be seen as the fiercest antagonist bent on upending the status-quo. In spite of periods of civilian rule, the Pakistani Army has dominated the political order in Islamabad and always exercises strong influence over civilian government.
BANGLADESH-
Bangladesh, earlier known as ‘East Pakistan’, emerged as an independent and sovereign country in 1971. It constitutes one of the largest deltas in the world with a total area of 147,570 square kilometres. Indeed, with the exception of a brief period, in the immediate aftermath of the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, bilateral relations have been marred by mis-trust, dis-harmony and suspicion. Either by design or due to drift, Indo-Bangladesh relations are amongst the least co-operative that India has developed in South Asia, although much more positive than those with Pakistan.
From an Indian perspective, Bangladesh has become increasingly resentful of its economically more successful and larger neighbour, resisting several large Indian-inspired economic projects and the related Indian investment and, more generally, all too readily blaming India for the ills of its own creation.63 At first, India seemed to hope that military backed interim rule instituted in 2007 after several years of government by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its Islamist allies, led by Khaleda Zia, the widow of its former leader, and no friend of India’s, would lead to better relations with New Delhi. It was, of course, disabused of this view by the time electoral democracy was restored two years later, when Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the founding leader of Bangladesh and head of the Awami League, returned to power. While both women command strong loyalty among their followers, both are tainted by corruption, which the interim government failed to confront convincingly. The levels of maladministration and corruption in Bangladeshi public life shocked even the other South Asians, largely inured to a high level of both 64 Of greater concern to India has been the strength of radical Islam in organised politics as well as the existence of significant Islamist militant groups, some with international links, including to confederates in Pakistan, and, it is widely suspected, in India. The fear of a Talibanisation of Bangladesh, while seemingly far-fetched to many casual Western observers, remains real and urgent too much of the Indian security establishment.
While Bangladeshis are concerned about the potential for Indian domination, India has its own concerns, feeling vulnerable to pressures from Bangladesh over the narrow Siliguri corridor that links the north-east with the rest of India. Apart from security concerns, many other actual or potential problems mark the relationship between these two countries including issues of border management; problems of water sharing, trade and transit related issues, and illegal migration.
India’s reading of the country is a factor in its politics: during the government led by Khaleda Zia from 2001 to 2007, overt hostility by Dhaka towards India reached an unprecedented peak. This was partly, foreign observers thought, designed to divert attention from internal problems in the government and widespread charges of corruption, but it also took advantage of the perception that India was partial to the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League. While these factors will not be so much at play under Sheikh Hasina, she will, nevertheless, have to overcome conflicted feelings among the Bangladeshis towards their larger, more powerful and economically more successful neighbours.
One means of achieving greater harmony would be to hitch Bangladesh’s economic prospects more clearly to the rising economic star of India, but this will not be an easy sell domestically.
AFGANISTAN-
India and Afghanistan are geographical neighbours and their relations date back even to pre-history. The Partition of India left Afghanistan bordering Pakistan but separated from India by a narrow band of valleys and mountains in Pakistan’s north-east. However, psychologically, India and Afghanistan think of each other as neighbours and friends (their positive relationship derived from added saliency as a result of the difficulties each has experienced with Pakistan).
Nevertheless, India’s policy towards Afghanistan demonstrates the dichotomy between its aspiration for a larger role in its north-western neighbourhood and the real constraints on it. Despite this, India’s engagement with Afghanistan has achieved considerable progress after many post-Independence twists and turns. India’s refusal to criticise the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979 isolated it from a large segment of the Afghan people. The shadow of the Cold War damaged India-Afghan relations. And the advent to power of the Islamist Taliban in the 1980s was deeply worrying to India. At the turn of the 1990s, India’s first challenge was to pick up the pieces from its shattered Afghanistan policy. Though India’s engagement over time increased, the emergence of the Taliban with Pakistan’s support limited India’s options. India supported anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. The dramatic developments after the 9/11 attack and the ensuing defeat of the Taliban by the United States-backed Northern Alliance (with which India also entertained good relations) changed everything. It provided an opportunity for India to re-establish itself in Afghanistan in a radically different international and regional framework.
India has provided generous assistance in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and nation building. High level visits in both directions are routine. President Karzai was educated in India, and is completely comfortable there. Despite security threats and attacks on Indian companies and their personnel in different projects, India has maintained its commitment to the reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan. India is also working with other countries like Germany and Japan in the reconstruction efforts and also in capacity building activities which includes training courses for diplomats, government officials, policemen, journalists and doctors.
NEPAL-
Nepal is a small, landlocked largely Himalayan country with an area of approximately 147,181 square kilometres. Relations between India and Nepal, long and interdependencies that small neighbours typically have with large ones. Links of historical, geographical, economic, political, religious and sociocultural nature, as well as constant flows of population across borders, conspire to create deep attachments but also deep resentments. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded between India and Nepal on 31 July 1950 forms the basis of Indian policy towards Nepal. However, from an Indian perspective, the 1950 treaty was driven by security considerations. One of the major casualties of weak, venal and self-serving governments in Kathmandu has been the lack of ambitious economic cooperation with India. Nepal does not have a major manufacturing base, nor is it likely to have one in the near future, but the hydroelectric potential of Nepal alone is more than sufficient to transform the economy in a dramatic manner. Nepal’s apprehensions regarding the inadequacy of its arable land and therefore the difficulty of creating large water reservoirs is understandable, as are worries over the challenge of people displaced by hydro-electric development, but Nepal’s inability to take constructive action where it could generate income (notably through hydro-electric development) is distressing to its friends.
SRI LANKA-
Sri Lanka is an island republic situated in the Indian Ocean, south of India. India and Sri Lanka have deep historical linkages. Fear of unrest among this Indian Tamil population both galvanised and constrained Indian policy at different times. From 1987 to 1990, India gingerly engaged in a degree of military intervention (in part aimed at addressing the large flows of Tamil refugees accruing to India) under the guise of peacekeeping, but this did not work well, as, contrary to Indian military expectations, the Indian peacekeeping force was soon engaged in combat with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), occasioning significant Indian casualties among its 20,000 troops (at their peak numbers) while failing to nudge the combatants towards compromise. A change of government in India allowed the new Prime Minister, V. P. Singh, to start withdrawing troops in 1989. In 1991, Rajiv Gandhi, who had launched the Indian peacekeeping force, was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomb squad. India’s relationship with Sri Lanka’s rulers has not been entirely comfortable ever since, which is why after 1990, India moved towards a more “hands-off” policy to the extent that sentiments in Tamil Nadu allowed.
More worrying to India’s community of geo-strategic thinkers and commentators have been the warming ties between China and the Rajapaksa government that, could, some Indians fear, result in major Chinese naval assets being developed in Sri Lanka, as part of a strategy centring on India’s encirclement.107 There is much inhibiting China’s ascension in India’s immediate neighbourhood, but there is no reason to doubt that countries such as Sri Lanka will be only too happy to play India and China off against each other to their own benefit.
Thus, in spite of tensions over Sri Lanka’s civil war, the economic relationship between India and Sri Lanka stands as a model within the region and could serve as an example for other capitals of South Asia.
BHUTAN-
India and Bhutan traditionally enjoyed a cordial relationship, although a distant one until quite recently. Although the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, calling for peace between
the two nations and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs on 8 August 1949, the relationship did not gain momentum until Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Bhutan in 1958, and was enchanted by it (as he normally was by Himalayan climes). While formally genuflecting before the principle of non-interference, the essential bargain between India and Bhutan involved considerable Indian assistance in exchange for Bhutanese deference to India’s foreign policy and defence concerns, notably as related to China.
In spite of this clear Indian dominance of its small Himalayan neighbour, the relationship has been a genuinely friendly, positive and mutually respectful one, with India working hard to keep its own profile in Bhutan as low as possible and the Bhutanese mostly expressing appreciation for India’s contributions. New Delhi pulled out all stops for Bhutan’s engaging new King’s official visit to India in August 2008, losing no opportunity to mark its regard for him and his country. (For those inclined to believe that India’s only mode of intercourse with its neighbour’s draws on equal measures of arrogance and unilateralism, the relationship with Bhutan is a prime exhibit of how India can behave quite differently when met halfway.) The bilateral relationship has undergone some structural change: India renegotiated the 1949 treaty with Bhutan and signed a new treaty of friendship in 2007 which ended India’s guidance on the foreign policy of Bhutan.
India has been Bhutan’s principal donor for the development programme. The first two Five-year Plans (since 1961) were wholly implemented with financial and technical assistance from the government of India. Today, India holds 61 percent of Bhutan’s debt stock, while multilateral agencies hold 28 percent and other bilateral donors hold 11 percent.
Indian assistance and aid from other partners, including the Asian development Bank, the World Bank and several bilateral donors, have allowed Bhutan to leapfrog over many countries that had started their development process earlier, by establishing the infrastructure for a credible knowledge economy and in supporting the emergence, essentially in the span of two generations, of Bhutan’s remarkable, often English-speaking, modern human capital.
THE MALDIVES– India and Maldives enjoy close, cordial and multidimensional relations. The two countries share ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and commercial links steeped in antiquity. India was among the first to recognise the Maldives after its independence in 1965 and to establish diplomatic relations. It fields the only resident diplomatic mission in the capital, Male. Since 1965, India and the Maldives have developed close strategic, military, economic and cultural relations.
ROOT CAUSE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN AGGRESSIVE RELATIONSHIP:
In 1989, widespread armed resistance broke out against Indian rule and corruption in Jammu and Kashmir. This began a prolonged and costly confrontation in Indo-Pakistani relations. Kashmiri people in the key Kashmir valley demanded independence. Some sought association with Pakistan, while others demanded at least greater autonomy. Civil disorder and kidnappings of prominent individuals increased. India strengthened its civil and paramilitary presence and casualties mounted rapidly. Pakistan insisted that it had a “moral and political” obligation to support several of the groups by providing funds, arms and training for young Kashmiris in Pakistan controlled areas. It also helped to raise radical Islamic resistance groups modelled after the Afghan resistance. Islamic volunteers from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Muslim states joined these groups. India strengthened its military, paramilitary and police presence even more and increased military activities, including shelling of villages along the LOC, to which Pakistan responded.
Every aspect of this continuing low-level conflict has been a matter of intense controversy. Pakistan charges the presence of 7,00,000 Indian forces are in Jammu and Kashmir, India acknowledges less than half of that number. Pakistanis claim over 60,000 Kashmiris have died since, 62 while Indians acknowledge less than half that number. Pakistanis accuse India of grossly violating human rights, India denies these allegations. Pakistan seeks international mediation of the dispute and insists that the Kashmiris must agree to any settlement through such means as a plebiscite. India argues that the two countries must resolve the issue bilaterally and international intervention is unacceptable. It further argues that Kashmiris can have free elections but cannot demand separation. India maintains this position, despite recommendations from five permanent members of the Security Council, other major states and even Nelson Mandela, who convened the 1998 session of the Non-Aligned Movement. A negotiated resolution that goes beyond just reducing tensions along the LOC is unlikely. Forces on both sides occupy long-held positions on the Schain glacier, where more troops die from cold than enemy’s fire. The military on each side acknowledges that these positions have little strategic importance and values. Negotiations failed because each side fears that withdrawal would be regarded as a sign of weakness by the military and political opposition.
Prolonged discussions, backed by high-level political support on both sides may be the only practical option. There is a need of focusing on the permanent settlement of Jammu and Kashmir issue and to avoid a dangerous boom of tensions. Privately many Indians and Pakistanis acknowledge the need for such discussions. Publicly, the prime ministers of both countries met in Lahore, Pakistan, on February 20, 1999 and issued a joint statement pledging mutual work toward better relations. Concerning Kashmir, they said, “We will negotiate sincerely on this particular issue and on all other issues.” Serious talks could have evolved over the next few years if new violence, terrorism or political shocks would not have occurred. Pakistan’s involvement will require political will and leadership, which has been absent. Pakistan’s incursion along the LOC in May 1999 shattered faith in the Lahore agreement.
SUGGESTIONS:-
❖ A healthy dialogue on river water sharing with Pakistan at all levels will help remove popular misperception of India’s intent in Pakistan. Facts and figures on the Indus Water Treaty should be shared with wider public in both the countries to counter the anti-India propaganda by some vested interest groups in Pakistan. This does not mean that India should re-negotiate the Treaty or give unilateral concessions.
❖ Apart from the structured dialogue at the official level, multiple tracks at the unofficial level must be encouraged to complement formal channels of communication. Unilateral relaxation of visa to facilitate greater movement of people without lowering guard on the security front will be a definite step forward in this respect.
❖ In view of the shrinking standards of education in Pakistan, India may also offer scholarships to Pakistani students and take active measures to encourage them to join Indian institutes of learning, especially in the vocational sector. This will help create permanent constituencies in Pakistan with a sense of obligation and goodwill towards India.
CHALLENGES TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA
Several empirical studies have concluded that most of the pre conditions required for successful regional integration are not present in South Asia. A review of some of these studies suggests the following key challenges to regional integration in South Asia.
- BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP-
South Asia is perennially plagued with multiple intra region and intra state conflicts either on basis of geographic boundaries or narrow considerations of religion, caste, language or ethnicity. These conflicts have since decades been at the forefront of political and public life in SAARC states, causing economic development to almost always be a sub-servient objective. The region rife with constant conflicts never provided the appropriate environment for supporting the efforts towards integration. The relationships between countries had some or the other historic baggage due to which they have still not been able to move ahead by burying their differences. The regions overall instability is also a challenge. Apart from bi-lateral disputes, most South Asian nations are facing serious security threats from civil violence and intra-state separatists and religious conflicts. - INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS-
Originating from the two nation theory11 at the time of partition, the relations between India and Pakistan have remained strained, marked with insecurities on both sides. Attempts to ease the tension have failed numerous times and there remain several unresolved bilateral disputes, the biggest being the territorial dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan feared that if Kashmir, a Muslim majority state remains a part of India, then the very raison d’etre of Pakistan would collapse. India, on the other hand, feared that giving up Kashmir would undercut its secular construct and promote separatists tendencies. In the past six decades, the two countries have fought three wars over Kashmir, while low-level insurgency persisted and the relations were constantly turbulent between the two countries. In the late 1940s, trade between both nations as part of one political entity (i.e. British India) was sizeable. Even in 1947, when Pakistan (Pakistan then included Bangladesh) and India became independent, more than half of Pakistan’s imports came from India and nearly two-thirds of its exports went to India. However, with growing disputes over security and territory, the trade between them declined. As the two largest nations in South Asia, the relationship between these two nations impacts the entire region. - LACK OF COMMON THREAT-
Most successful instances of regional integration have been motivated by the need to protect against some external security threat. The threat may be regarding territorial, ideological or political dominance. For instance growing power of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the emergence of the United States after 2nd World War was one of the considerations pushing Western Europe towards increased integration, even between previously adverse nations such as Germany and Italy. In the east, increased power and influence of China and communist regimes caused the smaller East Asian nations to come together to form ASEAN. In other regions as well, a common threat has caused the threatened nations to come together despite previous differences12. In absence of such a significant threat, nations often find some reason to limit their efforts towards increasing integration. This is one big difference between the South Asian and the Southeast Asian experience. South Asia seems to, so far have lacked a common external threat which would bring together the constituent countries. - PROTECTIONISM-
The economic policy of South Asian nations was based on the goal of self-sufficiency through import substitution. Increased trade within the region has been perceived as increasing dominance and dependence on India rather than as access to the large markets of India and Pakistan. Smaller states like Nepal and Bangladesh chose to import from suppliers outside of the region even at higher costs and showed considerable reluctance to accept Indian investments. Despite Nepal’s potential hydropower capacity being greater than [70,000] MW and a continuing increase in India’s demands, only 1% of this capacity has been developed by the two nations. Sri Lanka imports railway coaches from Romania when better-quality coaches are available at a much cheaper price in India (in the state of Tamil Nadu). Similarly, in cement and ship building, Sri Lanka can stand to gain by trading with Pakistan and India rather than South Korea. Pakistan in particular always aimed at diminishing its historical links with India and reducing any form of interdependence13. Over the years, increasing trade links with India has been subject to tough resistance from industry members and other hardliners. As discussed later in this paper, this position is slowly changing. - LACK OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE-
South Asian countries trade little with each other but trade much with other nations of the world particularly with North America and Europe. The composition of each South Asian country’s exports to these regions is almost similar. Textile, readymade garments, leather, agricultural products constitute a chunk of the export items while petroleum and capital intensive goods are mostly imported. Consequently, trade between South Asian countries is likely to be more competitive rather than complementary. All the countries are rich is labor but strapped for cash. No one country has a significant comparative advantage over the other for specific items. India’s economic prevalence and comparative advantage in a wide range of products has resulted in asymmetric trade relations with her neighbors. Further, until a few years back all countries were pursuing import substitution policies, which never allowed development of a particular area of expertise in the production chains. - POWER ASSMMETRY AND GEOGRAPHIC DEPENDENCY-
The biggest challenge to increasing integration in South Asia is the power asymmetry in the region. It would be relevant to refer to the power-centrist view on regionalism here. As per the power centrist view, power, both military and economic, is the most critical determining factor in regional integration arrangements. Increased regional integration is often a response to a powerful state from outside the region if the actions of the external powerful state are perceived as a threat. Even if the powerful/hegemonic state is from within the region, the states in the region may consider integration and cooperation to moderate the exercise of power by the hegemonic state.
These factors have caused India to be perceived as a threat by all the countries in South Asia. At the time of creation of SAARC and arguably till this date, relations of the other SAARC members with India have been fraught with distrust, hostility and apprehension. India joined the SAARC on the condition that security issues and bilateral issues would be kept outside the purview of the SAARC. Consequently SAARC became a forum for economic and trade related cooperation. However, since insecurities relating to India’s dominance and historic bilateral differences remain the core concerns of SAARC members, all attempts towards integration have been colored and largely unsuccessful. From India’s perspective, economic cooperation agreements entered into by member states with countries outside the region were perceived as threats to its security and further diluted its commitment towards regional integration. India’s also had the initial apprehension regarding SAARC that it may be an effort of the neighboring countries to gang up against India.
INSTITUTIONS: MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
The countries of South Asia were confronted from the beginning with similar problems of underdevelopment. But because of the bilateral tensions between India and Problem there were hardly any approaches for a multilateral approach to deal with them. The Colombo Plan of 1951 co-ordinated the development assistance for various countries of the region but did not become a starting point for regional co-operation.
The first initiative for a closer regional co-operation was raised in the late 1970s by the President of Bangladesh Zia-Ur-Rehman. Because of the tense Indo-Bangladeshi relations at that time he aimed at a closer collaboration of the smaller countries in South Asia in order to counter the Indian dominance. Despite the bilateral tensions the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) came into existence in 1985 including both India and Pakistan. Because of apprehensions that a regional organisation would be dominated by the other country in case of non-membership both countries joined the new organisation. The SAARC-charter included the provision that decisions had to be taken unanimously and contentions issues were kept out of the organisation. Until the early 1990s, the progress of SAARC was only modest. The annual summits were the most important achievement because they could be regarded as a confidence building measures on the highest level in case they were not postponed because of bilateral conflicts like between India and Sri Lanka in 1989. Until that time it is important to note that SAARC was not dominated by India that did not try to strengthen her hegemonic ambitions with the help of a regional organisation. India may have prevented SAARC from becoming a forum of the difficult to imagine how such an anti-India strategy would have looked like given the lack of common interests among the smaller neighbours. With the liberalisation in India after 1991 economic co-operation got a new momentum within SAARC. Since that time all South Asian countries followed a policy of economic reforms, export promotion, and integration into the world market. In 1991, a Commission was established to look into the prospects of regional economic collaboration. The results formed the basis for the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) that was ratified in 1995 by all countries despite the ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir at that time. Of course, the introduction of SAPTA could not overcome the structural constraints of the regional economies, like the lack of complementarity, so that intra-regional trade remained only two to three percent. A further improvement of intra-regional trade can be expected from the SAARC Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) that was signed in January in January 2004 in Islamabad. It aims at the creation of a free trade area in South Asia from the beginning of 2006. In order to support the economic transformation of less developed economies Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Nepal will receive longer periods for the implementation of SAFTA. The efforts in promoting economic co-operation in SAARC since the 1990s underlined again India’s new regional approach. It seems obvious that the idea of the Gujral Doctrine was in the background and the maxim of liberal-institutional arguments that economic co-operation produce absolute gains for all players. The free trade agreement with Sri Lanka of 1998 and the negotiations for similar agreements with Nepal and Bangladesh point in the same direction. The new Indian activities underline the change of India’s South Asia policy and her shift from hard power to soft power strategies.
FROM SAPTA TO SAFTA: EN ROUTE TO A FREE TRADE ZONE-
The members of SAARC gradually felt their way towards putting the issue of economic cooperation on the association’s agenda. The SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1995 with a view to paving the way for increased economic integration in the region, as trade between member states was practically non-existent, apart from a tiny amount of foreign trade. Alongside the agreement to increase cooperation in the area of customs tariffs and duties, SAPTA established the important goal of providing more support for the least developed member states. Although four rounds of trade liberalisation negotiations were concluded under SAPTA, the agreement had little real effect on increasing trade between SAARC nations. But SAPTA was successful in one respect: the agreement opened the doors to future progress. SAPTA helped to focus the alliance’s political leaders on the need for greater economic cooperation in order to achieve real economic integration. SAFTA was envisioned as a way station toward a Customs Union, a Common Market, and eventually an Economic Union. Preliminary discussions were initiated at the 16th session of a meeting of the Council of Ministers in December 1995 and the SAFTA agreement was signed in January 2004 at the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad, Pakistan. To move this process forward, the SAFTA Ministerial Council and the SAFTA Committee of Experts meet regularly to review further steps. Both bodies will meet on July 22-23 in Thimpu, Bhutan. The SAFTA trade liberalization program was officially launched in July 2006 and since then, the total value of intra-regional exports has, as of September 2013, been estimated at approximately $3 billion, a figure that the SAARC itself notes is far below potential.
2010 Wold Bank report implicates regional conflict as the primary reason for South Asia’s dubious distinction as the world’s least integrated regions and suggests that “policy and institutional reforms aimed at removing domestic constraints to growth and job creation have to be joined to market integration and regional co-operation.” SAFTA, however, is unlikely to achieve its full promise until Pakistan engages willingly in trade liberalization with India. India’s bilateral free trade agreement with Sri Lanka, for instance, has a shorter negative list than in SAFTA. The same applies for Pakistan’s bilateral free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. SAFTA’s trade liberalization process (TLP) is based on a process of tariff reductions, with India and Pakistan slated to bring down 2006 tariff rates to 0 and 5% within 5 years and Sri Lanka within 6 years. The rest of the LDC members were given 10 years to effect this outcome. 2016 was identified as the target year for complete trade liberalization. This tariff reduction does not apply to items on the negative list of each country.
LIBERALISATION OF TARIFFS UNDER SAFTA AND INDIA’S BILATERAL FTAs
India plays a central role in trade integration in South Asia and is also at the helm of all regional trade facilitation and transit issues. It strengthened its bilateral links with its neighbours by signing free trade agreements with Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka and a preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan. In recent years, India has taken several measures, both bilaterally and under the ambit of SAFTA, to facilitate trade in the region. In a major breakthrough, Pakistan has granted the Most Favoured Nation status to India in 2011, giving a fresh impetus to the SAFTA process. In this changed scenario, further efforts by India would benefit the regional trade integration process more than before. This paper examines the ground covered so far by India and the challenges that remain for it to realise the benefits under SAFTA. The issues discussed include tariff liberalisation, sensitive lists, non-tariff barriers, transport, transit and customs.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Under the Tariff Liberalisation Programme (TLP) in SAFTA, India had committed to reduce tariffs to 20 per cent in the first two years and further to the 0-5 per cent range by 2013 for NLDC members. However, India’s sensitive list for NLDCs continues to be quite large (reduced to 614 items from 868 items in 2006), especially when compared to that maintained by India for LDCs under SAFTA and under a bilateral trade agreement with Sri Lanka. India also has several items on the sensitive list, which are no longer reserved for the small-scale sector and can now be manufactured by large firms. Hence, there is no rationale for keeping those items on the sensitive list. The items on the sensitive list should include only those items in which Pakistan is competitive in the international market and India is not as these are items where India is likely to face competition. In March 2012, Pakistan moved to a negative list 1,209 items that cannot be traded with India and is expected phase to out the list to formally accord the MFN status to India.
INDIA-BANGLADESH-
Under SAFTA, India committed to reduce its tariffs to 20% for LDCs in two years after the commencement of SAFTA and in the second phase a reduction to 0-5% had to be done in the next five years. India removed all duties for LDCs in December 2007, ahead of the time stipulated under the tariff liberalisation programme for NLDCs. Another significant measure taken by India was the removal of specific duties. In December 2007, specific duties were brought down to zero for SAARC LDCs.
INDIA-NEPAL-
Indo-Nepal economic relations have been governed by the bilateral treaties of Trade and Transit and Agreement for Co-operation to Control Unauthorised Trade signed in 1971, 1978, 1996, 2002 and 2009. Another important agreement are the Treaty of Trade and the Agreement of Co-operation which were signed between the two countries by increasing the mutually agreed points of trade. An inter-governmental committee (IGC) meeting on matters of Trade,
Transit and cooperation to control unauthorised and illegal trade was held in December 2011. Both sides had a detailed discussion on various bilateral issues.
INDIA-SRI LANKA–
India and Sri Lanka signed an FTA in 2000, six years ahead of the signing of SAFTA. The India-Sri Lanka FTA stipulated that India reduced tariffs to zero in a period of 3 years and Sri Lanka in 8 years. India and Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) was signed on December, 1998. This agreement is in operation since 1st March, 2000. Under this agreement, both nations agreed to phase out tariffs from each other within a fixed time frame except for those items in the Negative list of each other.
MODI’S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has emerged as one of the most dynamic Indian, and indeed, International leaders in the realm of foreign policy. We are witnessing a remarkable transformation of India’s foreign policy in recent years. Rising India’s economic clout and recent changes in India’s external environment have uplifted India’s status globally. India now stands at a critical juncture, preparing herself to become a responsible stake holder in the emerging global and regional economic and security architecture. Realising the virtue of India’s geographical location at the heart of the Indian Ocean, the Indian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has laid out a comprehensive framework for India’s engagement in in’s maritime neighbourhood. A nation’s destiny is linked to it’s neighbourhood. That is why my government has placed the highest priority on advancing friendship and co-operation with her neighbours (Narendra Modi’s address at the general debate of the 69th session of the UNGA). Shyam Saran argues that the ‘logic of geography is unrelenting’ and ‘a stable, friendly and peaceful, neighbourhood’ would help ‘reduce political, economic and military burdens’ on India (Saran: 2005). In order to build a peaceful, stable and economically inter-linked neighbourhood, India needs to take the initiative of strengthening neighbourhood relations and forge a concrete neighbourhood policy that will benefit the region as a whole. This section describes the salient features of India’s policy towards its neighbours’ under the present government which assumed office in May 2014.
Narendra Modi is pursuing vigorous regional diplomacy by engaging with neighbouring nations and building political connectivity through dialogue. Modi has appreciated the much-neglected fact that foreign policy begins at the nation’s borders (C. R. Mohan, Five point someone. The Indian Express 2014). His first initiative in this direction was extending an invitation to all heads of government of SAARC countries for his oath taking ceremony. It was a clear indication of his desire to strengthen India’s ties with its immediate neighbours. Somewhere, there has been a realization that unless the reasons for the steady loss of Indian influence in the region over the last many decades is addressed and dealt with, it is difficult for India to emerge as a global power. Thus Raja Mohan aptly proclaims: “An India that fails to reclaim its primacy in the subcontinent, Modi can now see, can’t really make a lasting impression on the world beyond” (C. R. Mohan, Five point someone. The Indian Express 2014). Under previous governments, many a times New Delhi was unable to make use of strategic opportunities due to domestic political compulsions and pressure. For instance, under Dr. Manmohan Singh, the coalition government at the centre due to domestic political pressure from the opposition could not make full use of its capacity to transform its relations with South Asian neighbours. With respect to the actions taken by Modi till now, it is evident that he understands the importance of complementing both political relations and economic initiatives. Hence, he has made conscious efforts to build and maintain personal contacts with SAARC leaders. Through his visits to Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh, Modi made efforts to establish routine contacts with these neighbours rather than mere photo ops that are generally part of regular bilateral or SAARC summits. In fact, according to Modi, he chose Bhutan as his first foreign visit destination because of the ‘unique and special relationship’ that the two countries shared. During the visit, he declared his government’s aim of expanding bilateral ties and termed the relationship between two countries as “Bharat to Bhutan” (B2B) relations. He also suggested doubling the scholarships provided to Bhutanese students in India and offered help in setting up a digital library of two million books and periodicals in the Himalayan nation (Jacob 2014). Modi became the first Indian prime minister in seventeen years to visit Nepal in August and thereafter in November 2014. During his first visit to Nepal, Modi stressed on the fact that failed promises of the past should not act as speed-breakers in the future journey of these countries to prosperity together. Modi emphasized on the idea of trans-Himalayan regionalism during his visit to Bhutan and Nepal and reiterated its significance of being the keystone for Asian cultural, environmental, political and regional security. The effective articulation of India’s policy towards these countries and his instant rapport with the people helped in bridging the communication and confidence gap that had crept in for the past few years in mutual relations between India and these countries (S. D. Muni 2015). This shift in the mind-set of people in these neighbouring countries towards India was once again tested when India-Nepal relations hit a rough patch in September 2015 hinting at the unpredictable nature of foreign relations between states. Modi’s visit to Bangladesh with West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee by his side was marked by the settlement and ratification of the 41-year-old boundary dispute (Land Boundary Agreement) and announcement of a fresh line of credit of $2 billion to the neighbouring country. His actions were widely appreciated and helped in bridging the gap and the mistrust that has crept in the Indo-Bangladesh relationship over decades. . The government also has made efforts to open new opportunities for the North-Eastern part of the country by strengthening economic ties with Bangladesh.
With his visit to Sri Lanka, Modi became the first prime minister in 28 years after Rajiv Gandhi to take a tour to the nation. He emphasized on the shared strong historic and cultural links that exist between the two nations. It was clear that he was interested in making a fresh start with Sri Lanka as that country emerges from a troubled and turbulent phase.
In December 2015, with his declaration that India is in Afghanistan to contribute not to compete, to lay the foundations of future and not light the flame of conflict; to rebuild lives not destroy a nation, Modi assured the war torn nation of India’s support throughout (Modi, The Hindu 2015). India and Maldives entered into a defence cooperation action plan in April 2016. Modi stressed that Maldives’ stability and security is directly linked to the national interests of India and assured the island of support required to strengthen democratic institutions. The countries also signed other pacts in the field of tourism, taxation, conservation, and SAARC satellite (Roy, India, Maldives sign six pacts, resolve to expand defence cooperation 2016).
The above discussion highlights how the atmosphere in the South Asian region has been lightened by Modi engaging in political discourse and finally making efforts to reach out to its neighbours. It is distinctly evident in these recent foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the
Prime Minister that neighbourhood is of prime importance to India. In all his statements and actions, Modi has laid strong emphasis on India’s responsibility towards its neighbours due to its size and location (Modi, Full text of Narendra Modi’s speech at the 18th SAARC summit. Press Information Bureau. 2014). He put forward suggestions such as setting up a Special Purpose Facility in India to finance infrastructure projects in the region that enhances regional connectivity and trade. Some other proposed amenities were introduction of a SAARC business traveller card that would provide a business visa for 3-5years to businessmen from SAARC countries and duty free access to Indian goods. To improve access to health facilities in the region, provisions such as setting up SAARC Regional Supra Reference Laboratory for TB and HIV and providing immediate medical visas for the patient and an accompanying attendant to those coming for medical treatment to India from SAARC countries were proposed. India’s offer of a “satellite for the SAARC region in areas like education, telemedicine, disaster response, resource management, weather forecasting and communication” and also “capabilities and expertise in disaster management” for all South Asian citizens was renewed at the summit with the plan to launch the satellite by SAARC day in 2016. However, in March 2016, Pakistan decided to opt out of the ambitious SAARC satellite project. Though the plan to launch the satellite is on track, but it will now be called a South Asia Satellite (The Indian Express 2016).
CONCLUSION-
This paper has analyses the India’s perception towards it’s neighbours especially with SAARC nations. It shows how India has been playing a dominance role in this region and potrayed as a powerful actor in international arena. There are so many issues concerns with this aspects vividly explore which reflects the India’s both good and bad relations with these countries. The significance of South Asian regional co-operation lies in the fact that it represents an effort to develop Asian solution to the Asian problems in a co-operative arrangement. Although there are predominance of conflicts among countries that may be related to terrorism, refugee, water disputes the SAARC has provided a great platform for its solution. The issue of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status has raised concerns among countries. It is also true that SAARC has not functioned smoothly because of the disputes among countries. So, with the onset of 21st century, there is a hope ushering in South Asia that great regional integration will be cherished
through SAPTA and SAFTA. The prospects of co-operation among countries will be enriched than the past because of the stabilisation of democracy in most of the countries of South Asia.
However, despite the formation of such an big multilateral forum SAARC in this region there are always continuing tensions in this region and still unable to overcome so many issues like refugee, terrorism. The reason behind this continuing tensions scholarly contend that this region unable to conduct a multilateral and collective meeting among themselves. Rather they are always overcome so many issues through bilateral forum despite they have such an multilateral organisation like SAARC. And If we compare SAARC with other multilateral forums in the global scenerio it has behind away to tackle issues in this region because of the bilateral meeting of these countries.
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